Abstract. Although polygamy is common in many parts
I. Introduction.

*
Polygamy is a familiar and apparently robust social institution, found in 85% of cultures (Henrich et al, 2012 ) across many nations and around the world. Its most typical form is polygyny, where a husband has two or more wives, and in this form its incidence is significant in more than 50 countries (Tertilt, 2005 , Jacoby, 1995 .
i Though widespread and seemingly integral to the economy of many societies, the empirical investigation of intra-household behavior in polygyny has attracted comparatively little attention; the evidence we have tends to be sparse and often contradictory. Take for example whether polygynous households are efficient. it might be suspected that free-riding and destructive rivalry between competing wives hampers efficiency in polygynous households, (see for example Strassmann, 1997) but there is a lack of clear evidence on whether this is actually the case (Mammen, 2004) . Meanwhile, there are, competing views on the allocation of resources within polygynous families in Islamic sub-Saharan Africa, with some writers arguing that Koranic injunctions mean that wives are treated equally (Solivetti, 1994) , while others conclude that senior wives obtain more (Ware, 1979) or that it is wives with children who receive greater resources. (Izugbara and Ezeh, 2010) .
In this paper we take the research in a new direction, by reporting a lab-in-the-field experiment with polygynous spouses in a northern part of Nigeria, the country with the highest recorded number of such families. Given the lack of pre-existing data, we concentrate on some simple hypotheses. As with monogamous families, the most straightforward questions to consider with polygyny concern household efficiency and intra-household allocation. Are monogamous households more efficient than polygamous-in the sense of coming closer to maximizing household surplus? In polygynous households, which wife receives the greater share of incomes? How are resources allocated? These questions provide a starting point for our design which employs two versions of a one-shot voluntary contribution game: one with a fixed rule of allocating the communal pool and one in which the husband must make the allocation. In addition, we run a follow-up household survey 1-2 months later, in which wives and husbands are interviewed separately. In this way, we tie our experimental results to more traditional forms of household data. To offer a preview of our results, broadly speaking we find that both types of households in our sample are equally inefficient in their decisions -there is no efficiency penalty or bonus for polygyny. In terms of payoffs, senior wives in polygyny fare no worse than wives in monogamous households, but polygynous husbands do better than their monogamous counterparts. Most clearly, second wives are disadvantaged compared to their cospouses when men control the allocation of resources.
II. Background
Although polygyny is common and its prevalence has been negatively linked with economic development (Tertilt, 2005) , interest in it from an economic perspective has been intermittent and economic theories about behavior within such households are correspondingly rare (see Fenske 2015 for an excellent overview). Most attention has been paid to the conditions under which polygyny is an equilibrium outcome in the marriage market (e.g. Grossbard, 1978) . For instance, Becker's (1974 and 1991) pioneering discussion, variation in male productivity is given as one possible reason for polygyny. Total output may be higher when more than one female is matched with some males, compared to a situation where only monogamy matches are allowed.
Given such efficiency and a competitive marriage market, polygyny may result Against this, Becker 1991 raises the possibility of diminishing returns to scale in polygyny because one input (the husband) is fixed. Significant diseconomies might also arise through free-riding in the provision of household public goods or through the constant and destructive rivalry between wives regularly described in qualitative interviews with polygynous families (e.g. Solivetti, 1994 or Strassmann, 1997 . Mammen, 2004 , for example considers a data set on child mortality for Cote d'Ivoire (see also Kazianga, and Klonner, 2009 for neighbouring Mali), and concludes that intrahousehold competition for resources may lead to inefficient investment in the household's children. Against this picture of rivalry and mutual distrust, there may be some significant economies of scale in marriage size, such as through the division of labor. After all, in standard economic models of the marriage market, it is this division that helps drive the efficiency advantages of marriage over singlehood, and it would seem quite reasonable to suppose that there are continued gains from greater household size. Either way it would be useful to have some comparative evidence on the relative efficiency of intra-household decisions.
Perhaps the most complete microeconomic model of the allocation of resources within polygyny is provided in Bergstrom's (1994) well-known though unpublished paper. He supposes that for women there are first increasing then decreasing returns to scale in the production of children, f (see Figure 1 where r represents a turning point above which the function is concave) from the investment of resources, r. Given a low enough turning point in the production function, it is then optimal for a husband who cares only about his own consumption and the number of his surviving children to marry more than one wife and then allocate resources equally to the spouses when child productivity is symmetric.
[ Figure 1 here] Formally, consider a husband with income Y who must divide it between his own consumption and investments, r1 and r2 in the production of children from his two families. He maximizes the payoff function, ) ( ) ( ) ( turning points), then at the maximum r1 = r2. That is, the husband allocates equal funds to the two families and produces equal numbers of children, f(r1)=f(r2).
Consequently in any increment in income the wives receive equal shares.
We view this theory as a useful organizing device and provider of a simple null hypothesis in what follows, but it comes from a deliberately simple and naïve model (Bergstrom describes it as 'a crude caricature of the reality of polygamous marriage markets' which is probably overstating the point). As the author, says, though, "Because the structure is simple and easily understood, it should be quite possible to test it in applications" (p. 18 Bergstrom, 1994) and that is the spirit in which we use it.
Nevertheless, there are a number of important ways in which reality differs from the simple model, so it is useful to consider at least some basic extensions. For example, after some years of marriage the husband will usually have information on his wives' fertility. It suggests the more appropriate maximand is,
Where αi represents the husband's post-experience view of fertility. If resources are currently allocated to maximize this function and the allocation is on the concave part of the production functions, then a higher allocation is given to the more productive wife. For an increment in Y,
Where f'' is the second derivative of f. If, for instance, the elasticity of f(r) is constant, then a higher incremental allocation of income will be given to the wife with the higher relative productivity. For instance, suppose that ( , / m )
where yi is the age of the ith wife and ni/mi is the number of children per year of marriage. We might expect that i  is increasing in ni/mi and decreasing in yi (Bongaarts and Casterline, 2013) , in which case at the margin resources will be steered towards wives who are a) younger and b) have had more children per year of marriage.
Though this is not a feature of the basic model, the allocation of resources might also depend on the bargaining power of wives. Divorce is common in many polygynous societies, including our target site (see below) and it is often initiated by women (Jackson, 1993) . Whether this gives relatively more power to senior or junior wives is not obvious. Women only usually retain custody of young children, suggesting that it is older women who have most to lose from divorce, but divorce can be emotionally and financially disruptive when the bonds between partners are more numerous, making more salient the fear of divorce for a husband in a longerestablished family. The overall effects of these forces is unclear, but Izugbara and Ezeh, 2010, quote the view that "… in polygynous marriages in Islamic northern Nigeria, husbands allocate resources to their wives based on the number of children they have; the wife with the most children attracts the greatest proportion of his resources." P. 200
ii These models and concepts relate allocations to demographic factors and measures of bargaining power. As such, they are squarely within traditional economic approaches to explanations of intra-household behavior. Non-economic explanations of household allocation stress the power of social norms. In particular, in northern
Nigeria the Koran provides a powerful guide to social behavior. Solivetti, 1994, attests that local interpretation of Koranic law in northern Nigeria favors equal treatment of wives iii . However, Ware, 1979 reporting on polygyny elsewhere in Nigeria finds a perceived norm of preferential treatment for senior wives in the opinions of her small sample of married subjects.
Locational Background
Nigeria is one of a significant number of countries where polygyny is common and apparently stable in the sense that it has shown but a slow and erratic tendency to decline in the modern era. Polygyny is more common in rural areas by about sixteen percentage points, more common amongst lower educated individuals and common at all wealth levels. In the vast majority of polygynous marriages, two wives are married to one man, but nationally 2.6% of married women in 2013 reported having two or more co-wives.
Within Nigeria, marriage practices differ by religion, region and ethnic group. Our sample is drawn from the Hausa people, the largest ethnic group in the north of Nigeria who also live in significant numbers in neighboring countries such as Niger.
Hausa are Muslims and practice female seclusion as a cultural norm for married women (Hill, 1969) . Hausa is a patrilineal society and one patrilocal extended family normally occupies a single compound with separate dwellings for each wife. Married women often do not go out in daylight except for occasions such as marriage ceremonies or to seek medical help (Calloway, 1984 , Robson 2004 . Among the Hausa, the reality of female seclusion varies with the nature of the settlement and the prosperity of the family. In general, it is more complete in urban areas and amongst higher income families (Calloway, 1984) . In dispersed settlements, away from the main towns, there can be relatively little seclusion. Although seclusion limits their physical mobility, women have a significant degree of economic autonomy. They engage in various small-scale enterprises and many are highly active producers and traders of craft and food products. In this regard, children act as intermediaries with girls to the fore, hawking goods, passing messages and learning the skills of the marketplace. Robson, 2004 , reports that girls spend twice as much time per week on trading as they do on domestic work and four times as much time as boys do.
Within the region, population density is relatively high and most farming is intensive. Crops include wheat, rice, millet, sorghum, maize, cowpeas and groundnuts, but there is also some livestock farming and horticulture. However, the practice of seclusion means that while they engage heavily in agricultural processing activities for their own profit, married Hausa women play little role in cultivation, which is carried out largely by men with the aid of children (Hill, 1969; Jackson, 1985 
III. Design
To test efficiency and to examine male allocation within polygyny, we have two relevant treatments based upon a simple public good game (see Table 1 for a -8 -summary). We conduct the experiment on both polygynous and monogamous households, though obviously we do not have random assignment to these categories.
This creates a 2x2 design with each household playing one variant of the game (i.e.
this is a between subjects experiment). Table 1 here.
The first treatment can be thought of as a benchmark. In treatment 1, each subject, i, separately and privately receives an endowment of Ei = 400 Nairas(approximately $2.7 in 2010 which is approximately 1.9 days of per capita expenditure in this region using the estimates of household expenditure for our survey). Each person then chooses an investment, xi from the set {0, 100, 200, 300, 400}. The investments of the spouses are summed and multiplied by 1.5 and then each receives an equal fraction of the total together with any money that he or she has not invested. In the second treatment each subject separately and privately receives the same 400 Nairas as in The private endowment Ei was known only to individual i, whereas the common account and the final allocation from that account was common knowledge. We told participants that,
The exact amount will vary between people, but you will receive something between 0 and 400 Nairas. [Show the envelope.] Your husband will receive a similar envelope and he will receive an amount of money between 0 and 400 Nairas. He does not know how much you have in your envelope and you won't be told how much he has in his envelope. (Instruction for a wife in the monogamy case).
As we stated above, in fact within the sub-sample of households in this paper all subjects received exactly 400 Naira. Other monogamous couples were also partaking in the same sessions, in treatments where endowments did differ from 400. As a result, in a typical session about 26% of subjects had endowments other than 400. Our choice of vagueness about the partner's endowment is designed to mimic the typical household situation, in line with Iversen et al, 2011 . Asymmetric information about individual resources and spending is a familiar part of household behavior in many cultures, including the Hausa (Calloway, 1984) . Our follow-up survey amongst participants confirms this. This instruction was also chosen for ethical reasons, to avoid potential household conflict after the games. It allows an element of plausible deniability for subjects who do not contribute everything to the common pool.
It is worthwhile stressing that in this experiment the total surplus maximizer has no incentive to withhold contributions, even with asymmetric information, but of course players with different motives may wish to hide some or all of their endowment from their partner. Here this could be achieved by not placing some of the endowment in the common pool, but because there are other motives for not investing which apply even if endowments are common knowledge, we cannot interpret all failures to invest as evidence of deceit. The clearest evidence of attempts to conceal resources is provided when the potential investor also controls the allocation (i.e. the husband in treatment 2).
In the case of the strategy method used in Treatment 2, for monogamous couples, each husband made five conditional allocations -one for each possible investment level by his wife. For polygynous couples we would need 25 conditional allocations.
Under the circumstances of the experiment, this was logistically impossible, so we selected a subset of 5 possible investment combinations. If one of these combinations matched the actual pattern of investment, then the conditional allocation was binding.
If it did not match, we asked the husband to make an actual allocation once the true investment pattern was revealed to him. The husbands did not know the 5 combinations before they made their investment choices. They were told, … you will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. You have to decide how much to give to each of your wives and how much to keep for yourself. In a moment we will give you some time to think about how much money you want to leave in your envelope. After you have made your decision, we will ask you some questions about how you want to divide the money in the common envelope between yourself and your wives.
The experiments took place on five consecutive days in July 2009. The locations were five villages (i.e. one village per day) selected purposefully in the Kadawa, Garum Malam, Kura, Bunkura and Bebeji districts approximately 1-2 hours south of Kano city. The villages needed to be sufficiently large to generate a sub-sample of 80 households, to be isolated from one another to avoid contamination, to be largely agricultural but still accessible within one day from Kano. An initial site selection and a second visit were made to draw up a census of households in each village including identifiers for the number of wives. Using a random number generator families were invited from this roster, with separate selection of the monogamous and polygynous households. For all households it was made clear that only if all spouses turned up could they be accepted. In the case of polygynous households, households with more than 2 wives were eliminated from consideration. In the rare case of no-shows, we used the same random generator to find a reserve family.
The actual villages were between 4 and 10 km from the next nearest site. Their size was typically 200-300 households and the villages were highly homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and language spoken (Hausa) and religion. Approximately 10-15% of households fitted our requirements for the polygyny sub-sample. Given the state of the roads and our rapid movement from site to site, we do not think that contamination between sites is an issue. Certainly we see no trend in the results over 5
days. In four of the five locations, no suitable public building was available for the experiments, so maize plantations were used instead with people sitting on the ground. In the fifth location, a village school was available for use.
Our visit to a village consisted of a morning and an afternoon session on one day.
Each session had different treatments to reduce the possibility of contamination. We alternated treatments across morning and afternoon across villages. In each session there was one polygynous sub-sample of 8 households and one relevant sub-sample of 8 monogamous couples. In addition to these groups, there were other sub-samples of monogamous couples in the same session who were playing treatments that we do not discuss in this paper, because they have no comparator group of polygynous households. These treatments involved different rules for the allocation or different rules for the endowment and how it was generated. Within monogamous couples, assignment to treatment was random.
The actual experimenters were 12 (6 female and 6 with examples) and presenting all the treatments to be played in Nigeria. On days two and three, experimenters practiced in Hausa (and sometimes in English so that the foreign team leaders could understand). On day four we ran a pilot using a small sample of subjects. The fifth day of training was used to give individual and collective feedback on the pilot, to explain the logistics for the game days and to distribute the material needed for the game days. The experiments used scripts translated into Hausa and then back-translated into English.
After a very short initial briefing provided to all participants, secrecy was ensured by calling one household at a time and separating each person, with the husband going to one location with one researcher and each of the wives going separately to another location with other researchers. We then briefed the subjects on the nature of the task (see appendix for the instructions) and they then faced three test questions to check understanding. 
IV. Results
Tables 2 and 3 set out background information from the accompanying survey.
viii Recall that there were 40 households in each cell of the design. This makes 160 men in total and 240 women. Table 2 here.
The typical polygynous family is larger than its currently ix monogamous counterpart, has a higher income and the husband is older. As measured by the number of radios, or other relatively frequently owned assets, polygynous husbands are also wealthier.
x In our monogamous sample, around 20% of male subjects and 10% of female subjects report having been married before. With spousal death (usually a wife) accounting for 30% of cases in which marriages ended, it suggests that our sample has relatively low divorce rates compared to the standard view of the region (e.g. in Jackson, 1993 or Calloway, 1984 . There is some evidence of a bimodal shape in the second wife ages: only 30 out of 220 monogamous marriages involve a wife who married at age 20 or over; only 7 (out of 80) first marriages had the same status, whereas 23 out of 78 second marriages involved women who were at least aged 20. This would be consistent with Last (1992) view of a mixed motive for second marriages, at least some of which were not for the purpose of producing children.
When we asked polygynous spouses about cooperation and allocation practices differences emerged between husbands and wives, as documented in Table 3 . Largely, spouses reported equal allocation of time and money to wives, but with some favoring of first wives in decision-making. First wives were less likely to claim a major say in decisions, compared to second wives' perceptions of the first wives' role. Conversely, first wives granted second wives a greater say in decision-making than second wives claimed was the reality. Table 3 here.
-13 -We also asked questions about cooperation, both generally and specifically.
Answers were largely consistent between household partners: about 90% agreed that the wives cooperated most of the time, with the remainder stating that the wives cooperated sometimes (the remaining alternatives were rarely and never). For specific tasks, namely for child-rearing, cooking, buying provisions and agriculture the percentages stating that wives cooperated most of the time were lower, but still always the majority response by all three spouses. Meanwhile, around 65% of husbands stated that they would not hide any part of a windfall from their wives. The percentage was very similar for women, across family types, but second wives were slightly more likely to state that they would hide all of a windfall (20.5%) compared to first wives (15%) and wives in monogamy (15%).
We now turn to the experimental results, considering first the investment data.
Result 1.
Men and women rarely invest their full endowment. Table 4 sets out the mean investment levels in the common pool across the experiment at both the household and individual level. A basic feature is that, across all types of spouses in the different treatments and marriages, subjects rarely invest all of their endowments. Thirteen and eleven out of eighty men invest all their endowment in treatments 1 and 2 respectively. For women, the corresponding numbers are just one and two. In fact, the modal investment for women is 25% of the endowment and, overall, a majority of subjects invest half or less of their endowments. Consequently the mean investment rate overall is less than 50%.
Though low, these figures are not out of line with similar games played in Uganda (Iversen et al, 2011) , Ethiopia and India . Table 4 here.
Result 2. Investment rates do not vary significantly between polygyny and monogamy.
A second basic feature of this data is the lack of variation across treatments at the level of the household and the lack of variation across household types. Median tests accept the null hypotheses that rates of household investment are the same across treatments within marital groups and across marital groups within treatments. We do not reject the null hypothesis that husbands and wives investment the same fraction in monogamy and polygyny. In other words, there is no evidence of an efficiency cost to polygyny even in the treatment where all investment funds are shared equally between all partners. It is also noticeable from the last row of the table, that there is no significant difference between the investment behavior of first and second wives in polygyny.
Result 3. Husbands generally invest more than wives in both polygyny and monogamy.
For men the modal investment is 50% of their endowment. As a result, we generally reject the null hypothesis of equal rates of investment between men and women, although the difference is not significant in treatment 1 for monogamous households. Table 5 shows mean payoffs, that is total rewards including any part of the endowment that is kept back by the spouse from the common pool. Recall that if all subjects invest no endowment, then the payoff is 400 Nairas per person, while if all endowments are given to the common pool and distributed equally, the result is 600 Naira per person.
Result 4. In treatment 1, payoffs for polygynous wives are significantly higher than husband's payoffs.
Mean rewards cluster around the 500 Nairas per person mark. In treatment 1, polygynous husbands invest more than their monogamous counterparts and more than their wives. The equal split rule enacted for this treatment means that the rewards of their higher investment are shared around the family. As a result, the payoffs for polygynous wives are higher than husbands' payoffs in treatment 1. Table 5 here.
Result 5. In treatment 2, polygynous men earn significantly more than monogamous men and more than their wives.
In table 5, the final column shows tests of equality of outcomes across treatments.
Men do better in treatment 2 and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for monogamous households and at the 1% level in polygyny. In addition, in treatment 2, polygynous husbands invest less than in treatment 1 and less than monogamous men. They also claim more from the eventual allocation and this gives them the greater reward compared to monogamous men. and where wives are posited to invest 400, the mean payoffs would be 691 and 822 (tstatistic, 3.91; p=0.000).
However, for women the outcome in polygyny depends on whether they are first or second wives:
Result 6. First wives in polygynous households do no worse than women in monogamy.
Across both treatments there is no statistically significant difference in the payoffs to first wives compared to payoffs for monogamous wives.
Result 7.
Comparing treatments, it is second wives whose earnings are significantly lower when men control the allocation.
In treatment 1, on average second wives take away 528 Nairas, but when husbands control the allocation they receive only 435 Nairas. For first wives treatment 2 rewards are lower than treatment 1, but the gap between treatments is not so large. As a result, second wives earn significantly less than first wives in the treatment where husband allocate resources. Table 5 uses data on actual allocations. Table 6 uses the full set of strategy information and sets out the patterns of allocation in polygynous and monogamous households in treatment 2. In each cell in the section of the matrix dealing with polygyny, there are three entries, representing the allocation to the husband, to the first wife and to the second wife respectively. With the monogamy column the first of -16 -the two entries is for the man and the second is for the wife. For polygynous families the rows and columns represent the first and second wife's conjectured investment.
For monogamy the rows show the wife's conjectured investment level. Table 6 here.
Result 8. For both monogamous and polygynous households, in all the conditional allocations, men take the largest share of the rewards.
So, men take the lion's share of the proceeds. As investment levels rise, rewards rise for all parties with some sharing of the rewards of greater investment. On the whole, first and second wives earn closely related amounts.
Result 9. Within polygynous households, mean conditional allocations to second wives are always lower than allocations to first wives.
Result 9 which can be seen by looking at the Wife 1 and Wife 2 columns of Table   6 , means that the second wife's relative investment does not affect whether she comes out ahead in the allocation. Result 9 is particularly stark in the case where the second wife's investment is four times that of the first. In fact in only one household was the second wife allocated more than the first in any actual allocation. xi Out of the full set of conditional allocations there were 13 cases of higher allocations to second wives (4 from the same household), compared to 62 cases of higher allocations to first wives and 125 equal shares. Thus there is neither equal allocation of resources between families nor are there greater transfers to wives with fewer children.
xii Still considering treatment 2, for each wife we take the difference between her conditional allocation when she invests 100 and when she invests 400. In the case of polygyny, the other wife's conditional investment is held constant at 100 Nairas. The results are reported in Table 7 .
Result 10. Under polygyny and male control of the allocation senior wives earn a higher marginal return than junior wives. but that typically both wives are allocated similar amounts by the husband. In this situation, the wife who invests more than her co-wife faces reduced returns. Table 8 shows this by breaking down the polygynous households according to which wife invested more. We can see that when the first wife invests less she does particularly well, relatively. Conversely, when a wife invests more her returns are attenuated by the equalizing nature of male allocation. This we summarize as:
Result 11. In treatment 2, monogamous men earn the same rate of return as their wives, but polygynous men earn a higher rate of return than their wives. Table 8 here.
Regression results.
We noted above differing theories about investment and allocation rules in polygyny. In particular allocation may be related to past and future fertility as well as religious norms. In this section we use some of the other data from the accompanying survey to cast further light on behavior within the experiment.
In Table 9 , in all cases the dependent variable is the fraction of endowment invested. Since this value is censored at zero and 1, the models estimated are tobit. For the equation with additional controls, we try a large number of variables, very few of which have any explanatory power. The equations shown are representative, in that they include the few variables that have significant explanatory power across many specifications, along with some (insignificant) variables that might be expected to be correlated with investment. For male investment, the variable that stands out is female clothing share. Female clothing share is often used as an indicator of female bargaining power (e.g. Lundberg et al, 1988) . Here men invest significantly less when more clothing expenditure is on adult women. For women there is a similar paucity of significant explanatory controls. There is some weak evidence that older women invest more and that higher rates of female land ownership are associated with higher investment. There is stronger evidence that higher male income is associated with higher levels of female investment, whereas when wives perceive their husbands to have more leisure (the alternatives are women have more and equal leisure), they are less likely to invest. Apart from the constant, there are no variables that are significant in both men and women's equations. Table 9 here.
We turn to the allocation data. For polygynous households in treatment 2, let yi i = h, w1, w2, be the allocation to the husband, senior wife and junior wife respectively.
We are interested in estimating equations of the basic form:
Where X is a matrix of explanatory variables that can include features of the marriage, and household characteristics, while Z represents the investment levels of the 3 partners. The symbols α and β represent the corresponding parameter vectors and εs are error terms.
The key issues are whether and why second wives are treated differently from first wives. As discussed in section 2, the Bergstrom model predicts that wives will be treated equally. In the extended model referred to in the same discussion, the husband updates his priors on the fertility of the wives and channels resources towards the wife with the higher anticipated fertility. Alternatively, it may be that the being second itself directly affects the allocation. Another possibility is that the wives may have some bargaining power and this influences the allocation. Given this, for the additional controls, we select two groups of variables: fertility and wife's age are chosen to reflect the extended Bergstrom model. The other group includes variables that are typically used as proxies for wives' bargaining power (e.g. Kebede et al., 2014) : whether the wife's mother is still alive; and the educational level of the wife.
The final proxy for bargaining power is the presence of an older female child in the household since, as we noted, these daughters provide a valuable connection between secluded wives and the marketplace (Calloway, 1984 , Robson 2004 ). Additionally we include male age and total household expenditure, since these are standard variables that may affect male generosity.
A feature of the allocation data from treatment 2 is that about 40% (15/40) of polygynous husbands give equal shares to wives on all occasions. Figure 2 illustrates this point, showing the relative allocations of money, (yw1 -yw2), by polygynous husbands in all cases where wives had invested different amounts. There is a spike in the data at zero, a feature amplified if the data from all the allocation decisions is included. The difference in behavior between husbands suggests an underlying population that contains a mix of two types: equal splitters -defined as males who always set yw1 = yw2 in our experiment -and husbands who tend to favor the first wife, but more generally, associate relative allocations (yw1 -yw2) to investment levels and other factors. We begin by investigating whether there are factors that can predict whether a husband is an equal splitter. the husbands are equal splitters and zero otherwise. The sample size is given by the number of polygynous households in treatment 2 less two because of missing data.
The explanatory power of this model is limited (though it correctly predicts 79% of outcomes), but it suggests that higher household resources are not associated with a higher probability of splitting the investment equally. The only variables significantly linked to being an equal splitter are male age (positively linked) and the difference in female age (negatively linked), although this second factor is only significant at the 10% level. Table 10 here.
Let us now turn to the actual allocation using the husbands who are not equal splitters. In polygyny, the husband must split the allocation between 3 partners, but
given total investment, two allocation decisions (e.g. to husband and first wife), must determine the third. To focus further on the relative treatment of the wives we estimate the following pair of equations for 
Since it is possible that the error terms in the equations are correlated, we therefore Table 11 here.
The first thing to note about the results is that we accept the null hypothesis that the error terms in the two equations are not correlated. The row marked 'independence test probability' towards the bottom of the table shows the p-value of the results of a test of independence. In other words, little is gained by using the SUR approach. More to the point, it suggests that once the covariates are taken into account, the generosity of the husband towards each of the two wives is not correlated. The first two equations in Table 11 omit additional controls. The results reflect the fact that husbands take the major share of any marginal investment and also treat wives unequally. Essentially, second wives start nearly 60 Naira behind first wives in the allocation and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Meanwhile, the coefficients on investments are small, given that the sum of marginal returns to a person's investment must add up to 1.5. Beyond this key point, we see that the allocation to the wives is sensitive to their own investment and that made by the husband, but also to the investment of their co-wives. The marginal allocation to each wife is higher out of her own contribution, compared to the allocation to the other wife. The coefficients are almost symmetric, suggesting that at the margin the husbands do not favor one wife over the other. In the next two columns we use data only from the original five questions of the strategy method (and not the sixth question which was asked if the wives' actual investment pattern did not match the hypothetical pattern). We see that the results are not sensitive to this feature.
Adding the additional controls makes some difference to the coefficients on the investment variables, but does not alter the basic conclusion. xiv As for the additional control variables, it is worth re-emphasizing that this is a small sample and we should be wary of drawing general conclusions, but that aside three points stand out. First, older husbands are more generous, both to first and to second wives. Second, the variables that were given a justification based on bargaining power play no significant role in explaining the data, either individual or collectively. Third -and in contrast to the previous point -the 'extended Bergstrom' variables do play a role. We report this as:
Result 12. Both first and second wives are allocated more if they have higher historical fertility within the marriage and less if they are older.
Additionally, the coefficients on these variables do not differ significantly between the wives (p=0.45 and p=0.85 respectively for tests on the equality of the wife's age and fertility coefficients). Nevertheless, the fact that the second wife is typically younger than the first wife is not sufficient to overcome the basic tendency of the husband to steer relatively more resources to the senior wife. For example, when all other variables are at their mean values, a first wife would have to be 20 years older than the second for the predicted allocations to be equal. Alternatively, her fertility would have to be 0.05 children per year of marriage (compared to the actual mean of 0.27) for equal predicted allocation.
V. Conclusions.
Polygynous households are a significant building block of many societies, yet evidence of their economic functioning is scarce. We run an experiment with polygynous and monogamous households in the north of Nigeria and gather survey data on their economic and marital circumstances. In both types of families, spouses rarely invest all their endowments into a common fund. In fact the most common decisions are to invest either half of the endowment or just one quarter. As a result, mean levels of investment are low (and low compared to most other locations in which we have run similar experiments). A key feature of the data though, is the similarity of behavior by spouses in monogamous and polygynous families: as measured by the percentage of total endowment invested into a common pool, there is no efficiency loss with polygamy and no efficiency gain either.
Compared to the situation where the common pool is automatically split evenly amongst participants, male control of the allocation yields higher male investment in monogamy, but lower investment under polygyny. For polygynous women investment is lower in the male control treatment and overall investment levels remain low. Thus, in keeping with much of the survey-based evidence on intra-household allocation in West Africa, our results are therefore incompatible with simple models that assume household efficiency.
If the household is non-cooperative, then some part of the failure to achieve an efficient outcome may be due to risk aversion. If the household is non-cooperative then a player may view the investment as risky since she or he may not see the benefits of their contribution. Even then, risk aversion alone cannot be used to explain male behavior in treatment 2. Since a husband can always keep any investment that he makes there is no risk in investing all of his endowment. Yet few husbands do this, despite demonstrating understanding the mechanics of the game when tested.
Possibly, subjects do not wish to place money in a joint envelope that can be bargained over even after the experiment is over. If that is the case then risk aversion can also play a part in their behavior if they are unsure about how ex-post bargaining might play out.
Our experimental results on polygyny are also incompatible with theories such as the basic Bergstrom model in which there is always equal allocation to the wives.
Instead, we have evidence of a mixture of households. In some families, rules of equal splitting seem to be followed, though even here, the lower investment made by senior wives mean they have a higher average rate of return. Amongst families where equal splitting rules are not followed, senior wives have a higher marginal and average rate of return. For these households there is some evidence of a generalized Bergstrom model in the sense that husbands tend to favor wives who are younger and who have higher fertility. This evidence of a mix of households may help reconcile the fragments of geographically scattered yet contradictory evidence on intra-household resource allocation that are available for polygyny. For instance in an early study of Hausa, Barkow, 1972 , writes, "A gift to one wife means a gift to all wives and the gifts must be of equal value" p. 322, whereas Leroy et al, 2007 , conclude that children of first wives in northern Ghana fare better nutritionally, than their half-siblings.
Meanwhile in results that come closest to mirroring ours, Gibson and Maice, 2006, find that controlling for age and other variables, first wives have a higher body mass index (BMI) compared to monogamous women and second wives (who rank last) amongst agro-pastoralists in rural Ethiopia (see also Wagner and Rieger, 2015) .
For the households where the allocation is sensitive to seniority, it seems that both the historical fertility of the wife and her age plays a role in affecting the allocation, though not to the extent that the basic precedence of the first wife is threatened. Our household survey evidence suggests that many households are aware of seniority rules, and there is a corroborating theme running through some of the ethnographic research on local patterns of conjugality. xv For instance, Smith, (1971) in describing the Hausa conjugal contract includes the obligation to 'obey his chief wife ' (1971: 60) while Cohen, (1971) concludes, 'a senior wife is the most authoritative figure among the wives, and faced with one junior wife, the superior position of the senior tends to make her the winner more often than the loser in any competitive struggles that ensue.' .
What is the value of a seniority rule, why is it stable? We cannot answer that wider question within our experiment, but a number of quite different theories are potentially consistent with the practice. Older wives may have more power, but our data does not supply any evidence that this power derives from 'standard' economic power variables, such as income or separately owned assets or ready access to the -24 -maternal family. It is entirely possible that wives acquire a greater understanding of how to bargain successfully in the marriage or that a norm is enforced through some kinds of community-enforcement. Alternatively, a longer-lasting marriage may produce more sentiment on the part of the husband, but the role of such factors requires further research.
While the forces that determine the relevant treatment of the wives remain unclear, one factor emerges clearly from the male control treatment: the allocation of the common pool made by men favors first wives over their juniors, but above all it favors men, who are the only partners who consistently earn a rate of return above the 1.5 multiple offered by the experimenters to the household as a whole. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses under the estimated coefficient. *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10.
Female clothing share is the share of total clothing expenditure spent on adult females.
The LR chi-squared value is for a test that the equation has a whole has no explanatory power. The corresponding p-value is entered beneath it.
To make the coefficients easier to display, the income coefficients have been multiplied by 100,000. We have invited you here because we want to learn about how married couples in this area take decisions. We will ask you to make decisions about money. Whatever money you win today will be yours to keep.
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we want to make a couple of things clear.
 First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a research organization, and this money has been given to us for research.
 Second, this is a study about how you make decisions. Therefore you should not talk with others. This is very important. Please be sure to obey this rule because it is possible for one person to spoil the activity for everyone. I'm afraid that if we find you talking with others, we will have to send you home, and you will not be able to earn any money here today. Of course, if you have questions, you can ask one of us.
 Third, the study has two parts: today's exercise is one, but we will also visit you in your homes in the coming weeks to ask both the husband and the wives a number of questions.
 Finally, make sure that you listen carefully to us. You will be able to make a good amount of money here today, and it is important that the instructions are clear for you so that you can follow them. In a few minutes we will put all the money into one envelope, the common envelope.
[For the questions which follow, read off the amounts from these tables. Thank you. We will now rejoin your wife and put the money from your two envelopes into the common envelope. exceeds 10%. In other 25 or so, the percentage is below 10% but above 5%. In some cases, the data is over 20 years old and therefore may be inaccurate.
ii This may not be due to wives' bargaining power, since the needs of children will depend typically on their age profile. As such, a husband may allocate resources differentially to ensure the maximum number of surviving children (Maluccio et al, 2009 , Ukwuani et al, 2002 .
iii The relevant passage is: "And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards orphans, then marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if you fear that you will not do justice (between them), then ( v Scattered through areas south of Kano there are villages for Maguzawa, a nonIslamic group that does not practice wife seclusion, and who were sampled separately for our examination of monogamous couples. They are not included in this data set.
vi Thus the game mimics a household with constant returns to scale, as if for instance the investment goes towards a joint food budget. If the game were supposed to mimic contributions to a pure household public good such as a communal light source or radio, then it would be more appropriate to allow C to be constant.
vii Only two male subjects out of 160 and seven women out of 240 fail our checks of understanding.
viii Six of the first marriages were levirate and 1 of the second marriages.
ix Some monogamous families may become polygynous at a later date. Since this is not uncommon, men and women may anticipate it in their decision-making.
x We have detailed information on ownership of a variety of assets. Some types (e.g. cars) are too infrequently held to be useful indicators of household wealth and some valuations (particularly for land holdings) are not credible. Typically though, measures of wealth are higher with polygynous households; patterns of radio ownership can be seen as a metonymy for this aspect of our data.
xi Contrast this with the women interviewed in Calloway, 1984, who "… assert that men are not impartial, and that often disproportionate resources go to support younger wives and their children." P. 404.
xii Senior wives have more children, so there is an implicit rejection of the hypothesis that the family with fewer children receives more, but the hypotheses can be rejected explicitly. In only 3 households does the husband have more children with the second wife. So reanalyzing the data on the basis of relative household size does not change the conclusion.
xiii There is also the issue of the potential endogeneity of male investment. Using the equation for husband's allocation to self and the independent variables from Table   9 as instruments we run a Hausman test, accepting the null hypothesis of no endogeneity with a p-value of 0.933.
